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THE RELIGIOUS COMMITMENTS OF JUDICIAL

NOMINEES-ADDRESS BY JUDGE BAILEYt
D'ARMy

BAILEY*

Well, you know God is good because I almost did not make
it here on the airplane today. I spent fifteen minutes circling in
the air over Detroit, and, by the time I hit the ground, I had
twenty minutes to get all the way through Concourse A to Concourse C. Then, the door to my connecting flight was closed.
Fortunately, there was an airline employee that went down, typed
the secret code, and got me and another nice lady on the
airplane.
I suppose what might have gotten me into this posture here
today was that six months or so ago, I was sitting in my courtroom, handling routine matters, when suddenly in walked a little
teenage girl, a lawyer, a representative from the Tennessee
Department of Human Services, and a representative of the
court clerk's office. They said they wanted me to hear this young
girl's petition for permission to have an abortion, which was
scheduled for that afternoon. I did not know the first thing
about Tennessee bypass law (which speaks to the degree of preparation that our state administrative office has made for judges
on this important issue). Bypass law is generally handled by our
juvenile court. As our juvenile court judge has been sick since
January, the bypass case came up to me. I quickly learned that
the bypass statute says a girl who is not an adult, who is under 18,
can get an abortion-but that she has to first go before a judge.1
The hearing is confidential, and so I cleared the courtroom.
Then the lawyer, who is paid for by our state government and
appointed to represent the girl, the Department of Human Services (DHS) counselor who talked with the girl, and the girl
t On November 9, 2005, the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy hosted a symposium on The Religious Commitments of Judicial Nominees. Judge Bailey was the first speaker at the Symposium. His remarks have
been revised for publication. See also FrancisJ. Beckwith, Taking Theology Seriously: The Status of The Religious Beliefs of Judicial Nominees for the Federal
Bench (Nov. 9, 2005), in 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 455 (2006);
MatthewJ. Franck, The Unbearable Unimportance of the Catholic Moment in
Supreme Court History (Nov. 9, 2005), in 20 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'v 447 (2006).
* Judge, Tennessee Circuit Court, 30th District. J.D., Yale, 1967.
1. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-302 et seq. (West 1999).
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came before me. I heard testimony from the girl and from the
DHS counselor. My job is to determine whether the girl has the
maturity and the common sense to have evaluated the situation
and made a sound judgment to get an abortion without her parents' knowledge. If that is the case, then I am to approve of her
going ahead and getting the abortion.
Another judge had actually received this same case, and he
had decided he did not want to hear it. He said that he had been
in a law firm with one of the lawyers. Although this judge had
now been on the bench for eight or nine years, he felt he should
recuse himself from the case. Consequently, I went ahead and
heard the case without a second thought. A few days or weeks
later, I received another bypass case. This time a judge had
heard it, apparently got cold feet about having heard it, and
decided to reverse himself and withdraw the order approving an
abortion. I later learned that two other judges had taken the
position that they would not hear the bypass petitions because
they felt that abortion was the taking of innocent human life.
There are only nine of us, so I was a bit concerned about the
ramifications of their decision. One of our judges, Judge McCarroll, later issued a statement saying that he had certain religious
beliefs-he did not say religious, I apologize-the belief that
abortion was the taking of innocent human life. He could not be
fair and objective and, therefore, would not hear the bypass
cases.
I was concerned as ajudge about the judicial ethics of such a
position, and I conversed about it with Dean Koh at Yale. He in
turn suggested that I talk with . . . scholars on judicial ethics,

which I did. These twelve scholars studied the question, and concluded in a letter to our Tennessee Supreme Court that a judge
probably did not have the option of recusal in bypass cases.
Whether or not a judge felt that abortion was the taking of an
innocent human life, a judge had a legal responsibility, having
been sworn to uphold the law of our state, to enforce the lawand a judge should do so. If a judge could not enforce the law,
then, as people have often had to do when they face matters of
conscience, the judge should pay the price of his or her conscience. The price of ajudge's conscience would be to step down
from the bench.
And let me just hasten to say that I have not criticized any of
these judges because I do not think that I, as a judge, should
single out any of my colleagues for criticism. Yet, I disagree with
the proposition that a judge should have a blanket recusal in
cases of this sort.
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After I was contacted about the issues of this forum, I began
to think about this issue of judicial philosophy in a broader context well beyond abortion. I remembered that when I was practicing law, I handled a number of first degree murder cases
where my clients were facing the electric chair if they were convicted. I had to "death qualify" juries. "Death qualifying" the
jury in a capital case meant that I had to ensure all the jurorsregardless of their beliefs about capital punishment-would be
willing to impose the death penalty if the facts and circumstances
as presented by the prosecutor justified it. I had the toughest
time as a defense lawyer. The prosecution knew that Black prospective jurors tended to be less supportive of capital punishment than White prospective jurors, for the most part. And so
the prosecution could often streamline and eliminate a lot of
Blacks from the panel by going first to the question of whether or
not the Black jurors would support the death penalty. As the
prosecution gets to examine the jurors before the defense, the
prosecution would lock the jurors into saying that they were
against the death penalty and that they would have problems
imposing it. Then the prosecution would turn around and look
to the judge for a disqualification for cause. I would then have to
get up and almost beg the prospective juror, saying, "Look, you
don't have to be in favor of the death penalty, but everyone on
this jury has to be willing to set their views aside and impose the
death penalty if the facts justify it."
I turn now to the specific question raised by the forum:
What is the appropriate level of inquiry into a judge's religious
beliefs? My answer to this question is twofold. First, inquiries
into the religious beliefs of judges are very important and pertinent if the judge is intending to recuse him- or herself in cases
where the law conflicts with religious belief. Situations like the
one we are experiencing in Tennessee with several judges refusing to hear the abortion bypass cases could perhaps be avoidedor at least anticipated-if searching inquiries were made at the
outset. Second, with the questions of capital punishment, samesex marriage, and other cases before the courts today, I believe it
is wise and relevant to inquire into a judge's religious beliefs. A
judge's beliefs about these issues are likely to influence the
judge's judgment in the cases in which he or she participates.
President Bush said as much when he offered the nomination of
Ms. Miers. The code word was, "Well, we know her religious
beliefs." This was intended to say something to the public about
what we could expect of Ms. Mier's decisions. I believe that
whether we are talking about religion, or even in the broader
context, we are far too restrictive in our inquiries of the opinions,
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attitudes, and beliefs of nominees-particularly of those who
want to serve on the Supreme Court of the United States.
It is not often that I cite the conservative majority of the
United States Supreme Court, but in the 2002 case of Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White,2 having to do with whether candidates

for elected offices in Minnesota could state their positions on
controversial legal and political questions, the Supreme Court
shared some very interesting observations in dicta. I will briefly
reference them as I think they shed new light on this issue of
what is proper inquiry and what is not. The opinion was delivered by Justice Scalia, who thought it was somewhat disingenuous
to say the public should not ask judicial candidates what they
think about issues. Everyone knows that the judge has a position.
In fact, in the language of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White he

says, "[A] judge's lack of predisposition regarding the relevant
legal issues in a case has never been thought a necessary component of equal justice, and with good reason. For one thing it is
virtually impossible to find ajudge who does not have preconceptions about the law."' He goes on to quote from another
Supreme Court case: "Proof that a justice's mind at the time he
joined the court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification,
not lack of bias."4 Both the majority and the dissent go on to talk
about the refuge that some judicial nominees, in fact pretty
much all of them, take in refusing to answer questions about
their beliefs. The majority opinion in White says that a candidate's refusal to answer questions is just a voluntary deferral from
taking a position; there is no real threat to the concept of equal
justice and fair justice in finding out what candidates think.
And yet, at the Supreme Court level in particular, we are
hearing just this excuse to answering questions about beliefs. In
my opinion, this excuse is polite-but unfounded-fiat. The
excuse sounds noble, and it is very convenient in avoiding the ire
of people who disagree with, and thus may not vote for, you. In
reality, however, the judges have beliefs, their beliefs are relevant
to their decision-making, and sharing those beliefs will not
threaten impartial justice. Those beliefs should be open to
inquiry.

2. 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (holding that restrictions on the speech ofjudicial
candidates violate the First Amendment).
3. Id. at 777.
4. Id. at 778 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972)).

